ADAPT: a price-stabilizing compliance policy for renewable energy certificates: the case of SREC markets

Currently most Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) markets are defined based on targets which create an artificial step demand function resembling a cliff. This target policy produces volatile prices which can make investing in renewables a risky proposition. In this paper, we propose an alternative policy called Adjustable Dynamic Assignment of Penalties and Targets (ADAPT) which uses a sloped compliance penalty and a self-regulating requirement schedule, both designed to stabilize REC prices, helping to alleviate a common weakness of environmental markets. To capture market behavior, we model the market as a stochastic dynamic programming problem to understand how the market might balance the decision to use a REC now versus holding it for future periods (in the face of uncertain new supply). Then, we present and prove some of the properties of this market, and finally we show that this mechanism reduces the volatility of REC prices which should stabilize the market and encourage long-term investment in renewables

Densely Entangled Financial Systems

In [1] Zawadoski introduces a banking network model in which the asset and counter-party risks are treated separately and the banks hedge their assets risks by appropriate OTC contracts. In his model, each bank has only two counter-party neighbors, a bank fails due to the counter-party risk only if at least one of its two neighbors default, and such a counter-party risk is a low probability event. Informally, the author shows that the banks will hedge their asset risks by appropriate OTC contracts, and, though it may be socially optimal to insure against counter-party risk, in equilibrium banks will {\em not} choose to insure this low probability event. In this paper, we consider the above model for more general network topologies, namely when each node has exactly 2r counter-party neighbors for some integer r>0. We extend the analysis of [1] to show that as the number of counter-party neighbors increase the probability of counter-party risk also increases, and in particular the socially optimal solution becomes privately sustainable when each bank hedges its risk to at least n/2 banks, where n is the number of banks in the network, i.e., when 2r is at least n/2, banks not only hedge their asset risk but also hedge its counter-party risk.Comment: to appear in Network Models in Economics and Finance, V. Kalyagin, P. M. Pardalos and T. M. Rassias (editors), Springer Optimization and Its Applications series, Springer, 201

A non-parametric structural hybrid modeling approach for electricity prices

We develop a stochastic model of zonal/regional electricity prices, designed to reflect information in fuel forward curves and aggregated capacity and load as well as zonal or regional price spreads. We use a nonparametric model of the supply stack that captures heat rates and fuel prices for all generators in the market operator territory, combined with an adjustment term to approximate congestion and other zone-specific behavior. The approach requires minimal calibration effort, is readily adaptable to changing market conditions and regulations, and retains sufficient tractability for the purpose of forward price calibration. The model is illustrated for the spot and forward electricity prices of the PS zone in the PJM market, and the set of time-dependent risk premiums are inferred and analyzed

Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons from transaction-cost economics for public utility regulation

This article reexamines the administered contracts approach to regulation in light of recent empirical research that establishes the importance of transaction-costs in the organizational choice and design decisions. After reviewing the fundamentals of transaction cost reasoning and the franchise bidding-versus-regulation debate, the study surveys the empirical literature on franchise bidding, contracting, and vertical integration. The implications of transaction-cost theories for current policies toward pubic utility regulation and deregulation are also addressed.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47841/1/11149_2004_Article_BF00134817.pd